Authorization for machine systems
Every request proves itself. No keys, anywhere.
A boundary in front of your APIs. One cryptographic proof per request — valid once, nothing stored, nothing to steal.
A proven agent gets in
Attested, matched, issued, verified — then allowed.
- ✓ callingAgent
- ✓ provenAttest
- ✓ matchedAnchor
- ✓ issuedPassport
- ✓ verifiedBoundary
- ✓ allowedAPI
reason: proof valid01 The problem
Keys are everywhere. That's the problem.
Every integration you onboard leaves another standing credential behind.
- 01
Every integration gets a key
Agents, services, partners — each one holds a credential that opens your API, until someone remembers to rotate it.
- 02
Keys are what leak
They end up in config files, pipelines, and public repos. One copy in the wrong place opens everything.
- 03
Nobody can say what happened
A key proves someone got in. It cannot prove which request, doing what, was ever actually authorized.
- 97% of organizations had an identity incident last year — Microsoft, 2026
- 28.6M secrets leaked to public GitHub in 2025 — GitGuardian, 2026
02 The gap
~0
of ~2,000 public MCP servers scanned enforced any authentication.
Security scan, 2026
03 What you get
What you get.
No credential to distribute, a decision on every request, and a record of both.
Stolen proofs are worthless
A proof works exactly once. Steal it, and you hold a receipt for a request that already happened.
Nothing to leak
You stop issuing keys entirely. There is no credential to rotate, revoke, or wake up to on GitHub.
Every request judged
Each call is admitted or refused on its own merits — per request, not per session.
Evidence, every time
Every allow and deny becomes a record with a reason code. Audits read like receipts.
04 Watch it work
One path gets in. The other never does.
Allowed or refused — either way, it's on the record.
A proven agent gets in
Attested, matched, issued, verified — then allowed.
- ✓ callingAgent
- ✓ provenAttest
- ✓ matchedAnchor
- ✓ issuedPassport
- ✓ verifiedBoundary
- ✓ allowedAPI
reason: proof validA stolen proof gets nothing
The proof was already spent. The boundary refuses it.
- ✓ replayingAttacker
- ✓ spentCopied proof
- ✓ refusedBoundary
- API
replay: proof already spent- 01
Attest
Workload proves where it runs.
- 02
Match anchor
Against the policy you declared.
- 03
Issue passport
Short-lived, bound to this caller.
- 04
Verify request
Action, route, freshness, replay.
- 05
Decide + log
Reason code. Audited, per request.
05 Latency
The control plane is never in the request path.
Policy is pushed, not fetched. The auth plane sits in front of your own API and behaves like your own gateway, verifying locally against trust anchors it already holds. Nothing calls out to us while a request is in flight — so a control-plane outage degrades management, never enforcement, and your latency budget stays yours.
Read the full latency breakdown →Trustplane
verified locally · no external hop
Client-side brokers
credential fetched per request · extra round trip
Same request. One of these leaves your network before it is answered.
06 Use cases
Three places this changes the outcome.
07 Demo
Watch it refuse.
Claude runs an agentic query. The request proves itself and is allowed.
08 The model
Three planes.
The part that actually refuses. It runs in your environment, in front of your API.
- Verifies every request locally — no call to any hosted service in the request path, so your latency and availability stay yours.
- Carries the proof types: the boundary is where the cryptography plugs in.
- Ships as a container today. Brownfield: put it in front of an existing API, your code unchanged. Greenfield: write endpoints, never auth logic.
- No metering in the enforcement path — the boundary never phones home to count requests.
What you buy when one protected API becomes twenty. The management layer, not the enforcement path.
- Trust anchors: declare who may call, from where, in what window, to which route — and edit them fleet-wide.
- Agent auto-enrollment: workloads matching an anchor enroll themselves by proving where they run. No credential hand-out.
- Revocation: withdraw access by editing the anchor. Nothing to rotate, nothing to chase.
- Fleet visibility: every protected API, every enrolled client, and their readiness in one view.
- Evidence-grade audit: every allow and deny as a decision record with a reason code, exportable for compliance and incident review.
Custom pricing, scoped per deployment — cost tracks your estate, not your traffic.
For teams whose auditors assess the deployed instance, not just the code.
- The control plane hosted inside your own environment, so trust anchors, enrollment, and audit records never leave your infrastructure.
- Built for regulated and sovereignty-bound deployments where a shared SaaS control plane is not an option.
Talk to us about Edge — scope is defined per deployment.